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Delayed Action and Uncertain Targets. 





Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus 
about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse 
gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in 
the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been 
reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective 
climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required 
to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation 
measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global 
stabilisation target to be achieved crucially affects short-term investment and policy decisions. 
What will this uncertainty cost? Is there a hedging strategy that decision makers can adopt to 
cope with delayed action and uncertain targets? This paper addresses these questions by 
quantifying the economic implications of delayed mitigation action, and by computing the 
optimal abatement strategy in the presence of uncertainty about a global stabilisation target 
(which will be agreed upon in future climate negotiations). Results point to short-term 
inaction as the key determinant for the economic costs of ambitious climate policies. They 
also indicate that there is an effective hedging strategy that could minimise the cost of climate 
policy under uncertainty, and that a short-term moderate climate policy would be a good 
strategy to reduce the costs of delayed action and to cope with uncertainty about the outcome 
of future climate negotiations. By contrast, an insufficient short-term effort significantly 
increases the costs of compliance in the long-term. 
JEL Code: C72, H23, Q25, Q28. 
Keywords: uncertainty, climate policy, stabilisation costs, delayed action. 
 
Valentina Bosetti (valentina.bosetti@feem.it) 
Carlo Carraro (carraro@feem.it) 
Alessandra Sgobbi (alessandra.sgobbi@feem.it) 
Massimo Tavoni (massimo.tavoni@feem.it) 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 





First draft: November 2007; this version: July 2008 
This paper is part of the research work being carried out by the Climate Change Modelling and Policy 
Research Programme of the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and by the Climate Impacts and Policy 
Division of the EuroMediterranean Center on Climate Change. Financial support from the Italian 
Ministry of the Environment is acknowledged. The authors are grateful for useful comments from 
participants to the Conference on the “Economics of Climate Change and Sustainable Development”, 
Chia, Italy, September 2007. The usual disclaimer applies.   2 
1  Introduction 
According to the latest  IPCC report (IPCC, 2007a), there is unequivocal evidence  that the  
climate system is warming, and this is affecting both average air and ocean temperatures,  thus 
causing widespread snow and ice melts and average sea levels to rise. Global warming is also 
expected to affect both ecosystems and socio-economic systems to varying degrees, even though the 
impacts on natural and human environments are partly offset by autonomous adaptation actions and 
non-climate related drivers. The IPCC also points to widespread agreement over the fact that such 
changes in the climate system may be fuelled by global greenhouse gas emissions from human 
activities, which increased by 70% between 1970 and 2004. If emissions continue unabated, the 
average global surface temperature is likely to rise by an additional 1.8-4.0°C this century (IPCC, 
2007a). A 2°C temperature increase is suggested to be a threshold beyond which irreversible and 
possibly catastrophic changes in natural ecosystems - and hence in socio-economic systems - might 
occur. 
Parallel to this growing consensus about the scientific bases for climate change, the climate 
challenge has become a public policy priority, and is now ranking high in some, if not all, countries‟ 
political agenda. Even though policymakers recognise that climate change is a threat that requires 
widespread cooperation on an unprecedented level, they face great uncertainties, both in relation to 
the magnitude and severity of the impacts of climate change, and the costs of alternative mitigation 
strategies.  Despite  these  uncertainties,  the  recognition  that  climate  change  is  one  of  the  most 
pressing socio-economic and environmental challenges facing our societies has led many countries 
to take action and implement carbon mitigation strategies. Decision making has been based on 
minimising the costs associated with achieving acceptable levels of emissions or concentrations. As 
a consequence, the analysis of economically optimal strategies that stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) 
concentrations at predetermined, non-dangerous levels, has become an important research objective, 
as testified by the large number of studies and research efforts evaluated by the IPCC WG III 
(IPCC, 2007b). 
Yet, even if actions to counteract climate change seem to be warranted at some level, there is 
little agreement over what the ultimate target should be, as the long-term stabilisation target is 
clearly a political decision. While the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change contains important policy decisions, such as the introduction of emission trading and Clean 
Development Mechanisms (CDM), it falls short of a definite and effective response to climate 
change at a global level. Moreover, the first commitment period of the Protocol ends in 2012, and 
there is still great uncertainty over the details of any new global climate deal. Negotiations are   3 
already underway to define a post-Kyoto framework, and several proposals have appeared in both 
academic and policy literature (see, for instance, IEA, 2002; Aldy and Stavins, 2007; Stern, 2008). 
However, little consensus on a given framework has emerged so far. 
Policymakers  therefore  face  an  additional  uncertainty:  while  they  do  expect  some  form  of 
global  action  to  be  required,  they  do  not  know  which  countries  are  going  to  sign  a  climate 
agreement, nor do they know the ultimate climate stabilisation target that such an agreement will 
set. Though the UNFCCC has put forward a qualitative long-term climate stabilisation target
1, we 
are still far from reaching an agreement  about the quantitative interpretation of this target.  Two 
broad political positions can be identified. On the one hand, the European Union is taking the lead, 
demanding bold actions from its member states to meet the reduced emission targets agreed upon in 
the Kyoto protocol
2 and beyond 2012 (expiry of the Kyoto target). The EU and its member states 
are calling for concerted action to contain the global temperature increase over this century within 
the 2°C threshold
3. On the other hand, less pro-active countries – notably the US – tend to focus on 
a less stringent stabilisation target (around 650 ppmv for all greenhouse gases, see for example, 
Newell and Hall, 2007), which is expected to keep temperature increase at or below 3°C by the end 
of the century. 
Given the uncertainty about the scale and timing of future climate targets, it is also important 
to analyse whether the expectation of gaining better information should induce policymakers to wait 
before acting, or should the possibility of learning that the impacts of climate change are much 
worse than we now believe lead policymakers to take more stringent immediate action to avoid a 
necessity for abrupt and costly policy changes in the future if we are to have any hope of meeting 
ambitious stabilisation targets. 
It is often argued that the many uncertainties surrounding climate change, its impacts and its 
mitigation costs warrant a delay in taking action. In particular, one of the main reasons which 
supporters of the learn-then-act argument put forward is that we still lack sufficient knowledge to 
define which level of emissions could prevent dangerous climate change and, since this uncertainty 
may be resolved through research and learning, we should delay expensive mitigation actions until 
we have a better understanding. The argument is that if we take stringent mitigation actions now, 
and then find out that the impacts of climate change are less significant than expected, we would 
have incurred unnecessary costs. On the other hand, if we learn that climate change impacts are 
                                                 
1 The target is to reach atmospheric stabilisation at concentration levels that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the global climate. 
2 Emissions in 2008-2012 should be 8% below 1990 levels. 
3 EC Communication (2007) "Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius: The way ahead for 2020 and 
beyond".   4 
more severe, we can start undertaking stringent measures and accelerate action. But what are the 
consequences of deferring actions against climate change? 
In a much cited paper, Wigley et al. (1996) explore the appropriate timing of CO2 abatement 
actions  and  conclude  that,  in  general,  the  overall  costs  of  reducing  emissions  are  lower  if  the 
majority of the effort is deferred to the future. Similar results are found by Richels and Edmonds 
(1997) and Kosobud et al. (1994) among others. In contrast, Schneider and Goulder (1997) argue 
that,  even  though  there  are  compelling  arguments  for  implementing  relatively  mild  mitigation 
measures in the short term, this should not justify the absence of policy action now, because it could 
lower abatement costs in the future.  
Since the publication of these seminal papers, much effort has been devoted to identifying the 
optimal timing of abatement, but the majority of the existing works, however, do not explore the 
implications of having to deviate from the chosen emission reduction path sometime in the future. It 
is  clear  from  the  Fourth  Assessment  Report  that  delaying  action  at  this  point  is  likely  to 
significantly constrain future opportunities to lower stabilisation levels and increase the risks of 
severe climatic shifts. Short term mitigation actions would avoid carbon intensity technology and 
development lock-ins. Yet, the IPCC Assessment Report and the studies cited do not quantify the 
costs implied by delaying action against climate change. We tackle this issue in the first part of the 
paper (Section 2), where we provide new estimates of the economic cost of climate policy assuming 
delayed action, i.e. slow progress towards an agreement over a climate objective.   
On  the  other  hand,  advocates  for  immediate  action  invoke  the  precautionary  principle, 
particularly given the risk of triggering irreversible changes in the climate system. The slow process 
of greenhouse gas accumulation and atmospheric decay (see Fisher, 2002) may indeed imply that, if 
we fail to take action to reduce emissions now and find out at a later date that climate change is 
more serious than expected, we may no longer be able to reverse the climatic changes that have 
been triggered, no matter how stringent a policy we implement. While the precautionary principle 
seems intuitive in the case of climate change, the results of research on decision making under 
uncertainty over climate policy seem  to  confute this  intuition  – indicating that  the prospect  of 
obtaining  better  information  in  the  future  should  lead  to  less  abatement  efforts  in  the  present. 
Indeed, if there is a prospect of obtaining better information in the future, this should reduce the 
extent to which one makes irreversible commitments in order to better exploit future information.  
Several attempts at exploring the implications of uncertainty and learning on policy decisions 
have been proposed in the literature (see also Ingham et al., 2007 for a review) and, even though the 
results are not unequivocal, they seem to indicate that in general, the prospect of learning new   5 
information would lead to a reduction in current abatement efforts. For instance, Manne and Richels 
(1995) use an integrated assessment model to explore the implications of uncertainty on the severity 
of climate change impacts. They find that if there is a prospect of resolving such uncertainty, the 
optimal path of emissions reduction varies considerably with respect to the optimal path without 
uncertainty. In particular, the earlier the uncertainty is resolved, the more it pays to wait before 
taking action. Similar results are found by Nordhaus and Popp (1997). Strengthening these results, 
Ulph and Ulph (1997) find that even when the climate system risks undergoing irreversible shifts, 
uncertainty does not lead to higher abatement efforts. Even by introducing learning from previous 
observation (though imperfect), as in Karp and Zhang (2006), abatement efforts decrease relative to 
the case in which no learning is possible – and the decrease is more marked when uncertainty is 
large, that is, when the potential scope to benefit from learning is greater. 
A different approach is taken by Ha-Duong and co-authors (Ha-Duong et al., 1997), who use 
a  stylised  model  to  determine  the  optimal  mitigation  choices  given  uncertainty  about  the 
stabilisation target. They find that the existing inertia in investment decisions increases the costs of 
delayed actions, and that, in the presence of uncertainty about future climate targets, it is cost-
effective to spread mitigation actions across generations. Similarly, Yohe et al. (2004) explore a 
different kind of climate uncertainty, notably uncertainty over the target that policymakers may 
wish – or have to – achieve in the future. Indeed, given the current agreement over the threat posed 
by climate change and the need to take some action, this approach seems more convincing. The 
authors find that imposing a carbon tax other than zero is a better strategy than doing nothing until 
full information becomes available. 
The results of these last two papers support a policy strategy which starts at moderate levels 
but  increases  its  stringency  if  future  information  on  impacts  of  climate  change  confirms  their 
relevance. In this paper, we will achieve a similar conclusion, even though the analysis is taken 
several steps forward. First, we apply state-of- the-art stochastic programming techniques to retrieve 
the optimal strategy endogenously, that is within a single optimisation. Second, we carry out the 
analysis using an integrated assessment model that features a realistic description of the mitigation 
options in the energy sector as well as induced technological change. This allows us to go beyond 
stylised modelling representations and to evaluate the impact of uncertainty on the optimal portfolio 
of abatement technologies and innovation. 
This  paper  therefore  focuses  on  the  effects  of  policy  uncertainty,  thus  following  the 
recommendation  of  institutions  such  as  the  IPCC  that,  in  the  latest  report,  advocates  “a  risk 
management or „hedging‟ approach [that] can assist policymakers to advance mitigation decisions   6 
in the absence of a long term target and in the face of large uncertainties related to the cost of 
mitigation, the efficacy of adaptation and the negative impacts of climate change” (IPCC, 2007c, 
p.43). Similar suggestions are given in Stern (2007, Ch. 8.6, p. 202 of the online version) who 
writes “Early abatement paths offer the option to switch to a lower emissions path if at a later date 
the world decides this is desirable. […] Similarly, aiming for a lower stabilisation trajectory may be 
a sensible hedging strategy, as it is easier to adjust upwards to a higher trajectory than downwards 
to a lower one.” 
The objective of this paper is to provide a policy-relevant answer to the issue of delayed 
action timing and to suggest a globally optimal policy in the face of uncertain climate stabilisation 
targets.  To do this,  we use a computational  model, WITCH (Bosetti et  al., 2006), designed to 
analyse the interactions between socio-economic systems, climate change and mitigation policies. 
WITCH  is  a  regional  integrated  assessment  hard-link  hybrid  model.  Its  top-down  component 
consists of an intertemporal  optimal growth  model  in  which the energy input of  the aggregate 
production  function  has  been  expanded  to  integrate  a  bottom-up-like  description  of  the  energy 
sector. World countries are grouped in twelve regions, whose strategic interactions are modelled 
through a dynamic game. A climate module and a damage function provide the feedback on the 
economy of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere.  
The WITCH model is structured so as to provide information on the optimal responses of 
world economies to climate damages and to model the channels of transmission of climate policy to 
the  economic  system.  The  dynamic  and  strategic  features  of  the  model,  the  energy  sector 
specification and the technical change options make WITCH an especially suited tool to analyse the 
climate change policy issue, marked by medium-term investment choices and long-term economic 
dynamics and environmental responses.  
The  paper is organised as follows. We begin by exploring the economic implications of 
delaying mitigation actions (Section 2). We are thus able to quantify how climate policy costs 
depend  upon  inaction  time,  providing  useful  information  for  future  international  climate 
agreements. Then , we analyse how uncertainty surrounding the stringency of future climate targets 
affects early abatement, technology choices  and innovation strategies (Section 3). By explicitly 
incorporating uncertainty into decision making, we provide a risk management approach that can 
help  policymakers  in  the  choice  of  optimal  hedging  strategies.  The  paper  is  concluded  with  a 
summary of the main results and a discussion of their policy implications (Section 4). 
 
   7 
2.    The cost of delaying action 
As discussed in the Introduction, uncertainty surrounding the willingness and ability to take 
global action – and the expectation that such uncertainty may be resolved in the next one or two 
decades  –  may  induce  policymakers  to  adopt  a  waiting  strategy.  What  then,  are  the  economic 
implications of continuing along a business-as-usual path e.g. for the next 20 years, and agreeing on 
some stabilisation target at a later date? 
In this section, we explore the global implications of different decisions about the course of 
action to be followed in the coming 20 years on the Net Present Value (NPV) of policy costs for 
this century. In particular, we assess the sensitivity of 450/550 ppmv CO2 only (roughly 550/650 all 
greenhouse gases) policy costs to a 20-year delay in action, and also the cost of initiating a climate 
mitigation policy (either stringent or mild) and subsequently dropping it.  
The analysis is performed by assuming that a global cap and trade scheme is implemented 
(either now or with a 20 years delay) to achieve a given stabilisation target (either 450 or 550 ppm 
CO2 only).
4  The optimal investment and innovation strategies (particularly in the energy sec tor) 
are then computed and the climate policy economic cost is determined (see Bosetti et al. 2007 for a 
description of how policy costs are computed with WITCH). Table 1 summarises our main results. 
 
 
  Continue along the 
business as usual path 
Undertake a mild* 
climate control policy 
Undertake a stringent** 
climate control policy 
Take action now  -  0.3% (0.2%)  3.5% (2.3%) 
Wait  20  years  on  the 
business as usual path 
-  0.4% (0.3%)  7.6% (5.5%) 
Wait  20  years on  a  mild 
policy* path 
-0.03% (0.06%)  -  4.2% (2.7%) 
 
*550 ppmv CO2 only, roughly equivalent to 650 ppmv all gases 
**450 ppmv CO2 only, roughly equivalent to 550 ppmv all gases 
 
Table 1: The cost implications of delayed action, NPV GWP loss to 2100, discounted at 3% (and 5%). 
 
If world policymakers jointly  start taking action now to control climate change, the net 
present value of stabilisation costs at a 3% (5%) discount rate ranges from 0.2% (0.3%) to 3.5% 
(2.3%) of Gross World Product (GWP), depending on whether we undertake a mild policy (550 
                                                 
4 We assume all countries to take action at the same time. An analysis of the implications of differentiated timing of 
action is provided in Bosetti et al. (2008).   8 
ppmv CO2 only, equivalent to 650 ppmv all gases) or a stringent policy (450 ppmv CO2 only, 
equivalent to approximately 550 ppmv all gases). These figures represent the additional cost of 
stabilisation, compared to a world in which no costly abatement actions (the BAU scenario) are 
undertaken.  Notice  that  our  figures  are  somewhat  higher  than  the  IPCC‟s  estimates,  since  we 
explicitly account for free-riding incentives and other inefficiencies deriving from environmental, 
R&D and market externalities (see Bosetti et al., 2007).
5 
As  shown  in  Table  1,  t he  cost  implications  of  delaying  actions  for  20  years  vary 
considerably. In particular, they crucially depend on whether policymakers decide to undertake mild 
or stringent policy action after the delay period. While the cos ts of delaying to undertake mild 
actions are relatively modest (the net present value of the cost is equivalent to 0.4% of GWP as 
opposed to 0.2% of GWP with an immediate start), moving from the business -as-usual to a 
stringent climate stabilisation target after the 20-year delay is extremely costly – up to 7.6% (5.5% 
at 5% discounting) of the net present value of GWP over this century. This represents either an 
increase of policy costs of about 130-140%, or an equivalent loss of 5.7 (2.2 at 5% discounting) 
trillion USD per year of delay. Of course, this is likely to disrupt the common understanding of the 
economic feasibility of any stringent action as currently perceived by policymakers.  
Another  important  result  emerges  from  our  analysis:  a  policy  strategy  that  immediately 
begins to undertake some emissions reductions that are consistent with a 550 ppmv CO2 only 
stabilisation target, and in 20 years reverts to the business-as-usual scenario, does not harm global 
welfare, and actually leads to a very mild increase of GWP, thanks to the internalisation of the 
various externalities on carbon, exhaustible resources, and innovation. The same mild mitigation 
policy can be tightened at lower costs than continuing along a business-as-usual path for the next 20 
years: the net present value of the costs of shifting from a mild to a stringent policy reaches 4.2% 
(2.7%) of GWP, still well below the cost of inaction for 20 years followed by embracing a stringent 
climate policy in 20 year‟s time. 
The policy implications of this exercise are quite clear, and support the arguments that call 
for immediate action to tackle climate change (see, e.g. Stern, 2007, 2008): if we continue doing 
nothing for 20 years, the costs of shifting from a business-as-usual to a stringent climate policy are 
extremely high. On the other hand, undertaking some form of mild stabilisation policy seems to be a 
hedging strategy which, at virtually no cost, would allow us to revert to business-as-usual and, at 
relatively modest cost, to undertake more decisive action if a more stringent stabilisation policy is 
decided upon.  
                                                 
5 Most existing studies assume a central global planner and therefore internalise all these inefficiencies and externalities. 
In our study, we compute the optimal non-cooperative Nash equilibrium policies instead.    9 
The cost effectiveness of starting with a mild policy, leaving open the possibility of more 
stringent actions in the future has also been highlighted in previous research (see e.g. Olmstead and 
Stavins, 2006; Olmstead, 2007), even though no quantitative assessment was provided. Yet, the 
political feasibility of such an approach – from an intergenerational perspective – can be questioned 
(Frankel, 2007; Aldy et al., 2001). In particular, such a strategy would impose a constraint on the 
action of future decision makers and political leaders, who may reject it. To overcome this issue of 
inconsistency  over  time,  decision  makers  should  take  into  account  the  uncertainty  over  the 
willingness to control climate change in the future whilst taking action today. 
In the next section, we formalise the uncertainty that surrounds the climate objective. This 
enables us to devise the optimal abatement strategy and portfolio of mitigation technologies taking 
into account that future policymakers may choose from a large range of different climate targets. 
3  Optimal stabilisation strategy under climate target uncertainty 
In this section, we use a stochastic programming version of the WITCH model to investigate 
an optimal policy strategy given the uncertainty about the stringency of the stabilisation target that 
will eventually be established in an international climate agreement. This version of WITCH has 
been used to analyse other forms of uncertainty in climate change economics (see for example 
Bosetti and Tavoni, 2008, for an analysis of the uncertain effects of R&D). We frame the analysis 
on  a  scenario  tree,  solve  for  all  scenarios  simultaneously  and  account  for  non  anticipativity 
constraints (action has to be the same for different scenarios before the disclosure of uncertainty, 
while the optimal reaction to the information revealed when uncertainty is eliminated is allowed 
afterwards). 
This formulation enables us to devise the optimal strategy before uncertainty is disclosed, 
and identify potentially optimal hedging behaviour. It also enables us to determine the most suitable 
portfolio  of  mitigation  technologies  given  the  uncertainty  on  stabilisation  targets  that  will  be 
adopted in the future.
6 Let us assume that uncertainty about the climate target is resolved  twenty 
seven years from now, in 2035. However, today, the future target is unknown and three scenarios 
are assumed to emerge with equal probability: 
 
                                                 
6 Such a risk-management approach is particularly important given the low capital turnover of energy investments. As a 
consequence investment decisions crucially depend on potential future climate policy scenarios. Inertia in the energy 
sector  could  support  an  argument  in  favour  of  early  deployment  of  mitigation  technologies,  given  that  once  an 
investment  is  made,  it  can  last  for  decades,  let  alone  early  retirement  or  “retrofitting”  cleaner  technologies,  both 
notoriously expensive (Stern, 2007). On the other hand, a similar argument could hold for capital irreversibility of 
investments in renewables, thus suggesting that “wait and see” would be the optimal choice (Kolstad, 1993; Kolstad, 
1996a; Kolstad, 1996b).   10 
o  BAU(no  target): no constraint on emissions. No agreement on a common target is achieved, 
and countries are free to adopt their own BAU emission levels. This is an extreme scenario 
in  which  there  is  a  complete  stall  in  international  negotiations  and  consequently  single 
regions decide not to commit to any mitigation from 2035 on. It could also be read as a 
scenario in which by 2035 either we discover that climate change theories are unfounded (or 
un-anthropogenic)  or  we  discover  a  perfect  geo-engineering  solution  that  allows  carbon 
emissions to be decoupled from climate warming. 
o   550 ppm CO2 stabilization.  We assume an international climate agreement is reached, with 
a target of carbon concentrations in 2100 of 550 ppm (CO2 only; 650 ppm all GHGs). 
o  450 ppm CO2 stabilization.  We assume an international climate agreement is reached, with 
a target of carbon concentrations in 2100 of 450 ppm (CO2 only; 550 ppm all GHGs). 
 
We  adopt  a  uniform  probability  distribution
7  to express an uninformative a priori that 
foresees equal chances of any of the three scenarios materialising.  
 
3.1    Emissions and investments in the energy sector 
Using  the  above  assumptions,  we  compute  the  optimal  investment  path  for  all  energy 
technologies, for physical capital and for R&D as a non-cooperative equilibrium of the game among 
the  twelve  world  regions  represented  in  WITCH.  Figure  1  reports  the  resulting  global  carbon 
emissions trajectories over this century for the stochastic case and the deterministic cases of no 



















































Figure 1:  Fossil fuel emissions for optimal stochastic and deterministic cases,  
to 2100 (left) and to 2030 (right). 
 
                                                 
7 We also experimented with different probability distributions, and found the results to be robust.   11 
The figure shows the three different deterministic cases vis à vis the stochastic one that takes 
into account the fact that all three are possible. It provides clear evidence of hedging behaviour: the 
optimal  strategy  before  uncertainty  is  resolved  is  to  engage  in  significant  mitigation.  In  2030, 
emissions are 57% lower than in the BAU scenario, essentially the same as they are today. That is 
to say, in a world that has an equal chance of being confronted with no climate policy, a mild policy 
or a stringent policy in 30 year‟s time, the best strategy in the short-term (for the next two decades) 
is  to  minimise  emission  growth.  Emissions  in  2030  would  also  be  23%  lower  than  the  target 
prescribed by the mild policy, and only 14% higher than the more stringent one. 
The  low  level  of  emissions  in  the  stochastic  scenario  is  driven  by  the  possibility  of  a 
stringent climate target, albeit this has just a 33% chance of occurring. The convexity of marginal 
abatement costs in the mitigation levels is the reason for this risk-averse approach. As shown in the 
right  panel  of  Figure  1,  the  optimal  emission  path  is  always  below  the  average  of  the  three 
deterministic cases, by 1.6 GtC in 2030, or 22%. This quantifies the dimension of the precautionary 
strategy. 
From a public policy perspective, it is interesting to see how the portfolio of mitigation 
options is affected by explicit accounting for climate target uncertainty. Figure 2 highlights two 
important implications for investment strategies, aimed at improving energy and carbon efficiency 
respectively. Optimal public expenditure on R&D to enhance energy efficiency in the stochastic 
case (left panel) is close to the amount spent in the more stringent scenario especially in the first 
period, and always above the average of the deterministic cases. This indicates that energy-saving 
measures are optimal in the short term even when a weak stabilisation target is likely to be set in 
the future. This is in line with the common belief that energy efficiency measures are a priority and 
should be undertaken anyway. 
 


























































Figure 2: Investments in Energy Efficiency R&D (left) and Nuclear power capacity (right).   12 
 
Nonetheless, in order to attain the emission reductions required by the optimal hedging 
strategy, the energy sector should also adopt substantial decarbonisation measures; the right panel 
of Figure 2 shows that in the stochastic case investments in carbon-free nuclear power plants are 
above  those  in  the  BAU  scenario  and  in  the  550  (CO2  only)  scenario.  Again,  these  optimal 
investment profiles describe a hedging strategy that would decrease the carbon intensity of energy 
beyond the average of the three deterministic cases.   
In  terms  of  the  policy  prescriptions  that  we  can  derive  from  the  optimal  trajectory, 
investments in public energy R&D should be roughly doubled with respect to those in the BAU 
scenario, which would be a spending policy akin to the innovation effort of the 1980s. A similar 
path should be undertaken for increasing nuclear power capacity, with average global additions at 
about 15 GW per year up to 2035. 
Figure 3 shows the aggregated picture of departures from the BAU scenario in terms of 
energy intensity (total primary energy supply over GWP) and carbon intensity of energy (carbon 
emissions over total primary energy supply). The picture shows that optimal climate policy under 
uncertainty  requires  action  for  both  energy  efficiency  and  decarbonisation,  and  that  more 
ambitious targets require a shift along both the horizontal and vertical axes.  
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Figure 3: Improvements of energy and carbon intensities over BAU, 2010-2030 
 
Once again, we see how the optimal strategy under uncertainty lies between the 450 and 
550 scenarios. It also lies to the right of the average of deterministic cases, reinforcing the message   13 
that the hedged mitigation portfolio should give comparable priority to energy savings and carbon-
free technology development. 
 
3.2    The economic cost of sub-optimal strategies.  
Another interesting exercise is to quantify the economic loss resulting from non-compliance 
with the hedging strategy detailed in the previous section, and the pursuit of the optimal investment 
strategies for the deterministic cases. In order to do this, we run the stochastic version of the model, 
but fix all the choice variables to those of the three deterministic cases until 2035 (the time frame to 
uncertainty resolution); from that point on, the model is free to optimise for each of the three states 
of the world, given the sub-optimal choices undertaken during the first periods. This enables us to 
quantify the economic losses that would result from sticking to either a BAU Scenario, a 550 ppm 
stabilisation policy or a 450 ppm stabilisation scenario (thus not adhering to the optimal strategy) in 
the periods before the final outcome of the ICA is known. 
The first important result is that following the BAU scenario from now to 2035 does not 
allow a feasible solution to the optimisation problem if the target after 2035 is the ambitious one 
(450  CO2  (550e)).  In  other  words,  a  BAU  strategy  for  the  next  three  decades  precludes  the 
attainment of the more stringent stabilisation target. This result extends the one seen in the first part 
of the paper, which showed that policy costs increase sharply with the period of inaction. It should 
be noted that accounting for technologies that can achieve negative carbon emissions might allow a 
solution even in this case; however, such a scenario is highly questionable and has thus not been 
included in this analysis.  
Sub-optimal  strategies  aiming  at  550  and  450  result  in  more  and  less  emissions 
(respectively) than the optimal strategy does before 2035 - and vice versa thereafter - as noted in the 
previous section. We thus expect that following a mild 550 policy would lead to improved outputs 
in the first decades, followed by deterioration, and that the opposite would be true if we followed an 
emission mitigation policy that was more stringent than the optimal one, such as aiming for the 450 
target. This is what is shown in Figure 4, where the gap between the expected value of Global 
World Product for the sub-optimal cases and the optimal one is shown.  
One can see that committing to more mitigation results initially in economic loss, but leads 
to a higher output after the resolution of uncertainty, due to the fact that burden of meeting the 
stringent target in the future has been alleviated. On the other hand, a sub-optimal 450 strategy 
inflicts costs that are somewhat higher than the benefits of a milder choice (-0.8% GWP losses in 
2035 for 450, as opposed to +0.45% gains for 550) in the short term. The picture reverses after   14 
2035, when the costs of under-abatement before shifting to a stringent policy are higher than the 
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Figure 4: GWP differences of sub-optimal strategies w.r.t the optimal hedging one. 
 
Eventually, the way we discount variations of GWP over time determines the merit order of 
either sub-optimal strategies, see Table 2. Using a low actualisation rate (3%), we find that the sub-
optimal 550 ppm strategy entails an economic penalty of around 17% (from the 1.4% GWP loss 
for the stochastic case to 1.7% GWP loss in this case), whereas in the 450 ppm case, the loss is 
much smaller (1.7%, from 1.4% to 1.5%). The opposite holds when we discount at a higher rate 
(5%), which essentially implies more emphasis on the costs and benefits attained in the first half of 
the century: here, a milder climate change strategy has almost no negative economic impact on 
policy costs, as it allows for greater initial economic growth, whereas a more ambitious one leads 
to a penalty of about 16%.  
 
 
Discount  factor  for 
NPV calculation 
3%  5% 
Sub-optimal 550  17.2%  0.01% 
Sub-optimal 450  1.7%  16.2% 
   
Table 2: Economic penalty (extra NPV GWP loss) of sub-optimal strategies at  
 450 and 550 (w.r.t to the optimal one under uncertainty).   15 
Summing up, the optimal strategy before 2035 in the presence of uncertainty about future 
stabilisation targets is a mitigation policy that results in an emissions trajectory that lies between 
the 450 and 550 trajectories. Choosing either of those two policies results in economic inefficiency 
ranging  from  about  zero  to  16-17%  of  GWP,  depending  on  the  discount  rate.  Pursuing  less 
mitigation than the 550 ppm policy significantly increases these extra costs (to unbearable levels if 
no action is undertaken). 
4  Conclusions 
Despite  the  emergence  of  a  scientific  consensus  over  the  necessity  of  stringent  climate 
targets, no effective international agreement to reduce carbon emissions has yet been achieved. As a 
consequence, the definition of a global stabilisation objective for the next decades is at present, and 
for the foreseeable future, very uncertain. The economic analysis of climate change policies should 
take this uncertainty into account to avoid misleading policy recommendations. 
This  paper  constitutes  an  attempt  to  provide  better  information  to  policymakers  by 
identifying the short-term implications of uncertainty about future climate targets and by computing 
the cost of delaying the introduction of effective mitigation strategies. 
Despite general warnings on the risks of inaction, most estimates of the cost of mitigation 
policies have tended to underestimate the cost of delaying action. In the first part of the paper, we 
show that this cost is far from negligible, even in a model in which technology is flexible and 
endogenous, and R&D investments are optimally chosen. We quantify the cost of a 20-year delay in 
action as an increase of GWP losses of about 140%, or in the range (depending on discounting) of 
2.2-5.7 trillion USD per year of delay. We also show how committing to a mild abatement effort in 
the short-term might substantially reduces the cost of delaying action. 
In  the  second  part,  we  analyse  the  short-term  policy  implications  of  the  uncertainty 
surrounding  future  climate  targets.  Results  point  clearly  to  precautionary  behaviour  in  which 
emissions are considerably reduced below the expected value of the deterministic cases. We show 
that the optimal portfolio of technologies in the presence of climate target uncertainty includes 
investments  in  energy  efficiency  improvements,  but  also  in  technologies  that  enhance 
decarbonisation.  
Finally, we quantify the economic inefficiencies of sub-optimal policy strategies – i.e. those 
that do not account for future policy uncertainty – in different cases (ranging from inaction to strong 
emission reduction). We show that the adoption of a “wrong” policy strategy in the short-term may 
considerably increase the economic costs of GHG stabilisation.   
The results  presented in this  paper support the adoption of a precautionary approach to 
climate policymaking. The optimal mitigation strategy in the presence of uncertainty is a highly   16 
ambitious one (e.g. the one that achieves a 450 ppm target) rather than a moderate one. At the same 
time, the cost of adopting a moderate climate strategy in the first decades, and then shifting to the 
ambitious one if necessary, is relatively small. This result is consistent with the conclusion that 
delaying action is not too costly if a moderate climate policy is adopted in the short-term (but it may 
become very costly if no action is taken at all). 
The model used in this paper is limited in relation to the exogenous probability distribution 
of  future  climate  targets.  Further  research  will  focus  on  endogenising  the  uncertainty  over  the 
probabilities  of  more  or  less  stringent  future  climate  policies.  These  probabilities  are  indeed  a 
function of the mitigation efforts undertaken over time, and of the resulting technological progress 
that would be induced. 
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